SECRET

DDI #01774-84/1 2 April 1984

NOTE TO: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence FROM

SUBJECT: Your Memo on North Korea (and others)

In response to your note, you may have missed two recent papers on North Korea that provide economic, political and sociological information about North Korea providing us with early warning information. Indeed, Dave McManis sent a special note to the authors on the value of these papers (which I attach). Beyond these two papers, you should be aware that our East Asian Office is drafting a paper on North Korean activities around the world which we expect to have by the end of next month.

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In addition, we have a number of papers underway which are responsive to your suggestion that we develop a catalogue of the nature and capabilities of a number of other countries such as East Germany, Cuba, South Yemen and Bulgaria for destabilization, fostering and supporting insurgency and so on. I attach a note from that details all of these papers that will be done during the course of the next six months. I think they are fairly responsive to your concern. The question we might look at is whether to do a summary/overview paper this fall taking the essence of all of papers. That may be a worthwhile undertaking.

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Robert/ p. Gates

Attachments:

North Korea: Assuring Civilian Response to Military Needs, dtd21Feb84, Factors Driving North Korea's Behavior, dtdMar84, EA 84-10045, SECRET D/OGI Memo, dtd30Mar84

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DDI 01774-84/1

SUBJECT: DCI Memo on North Korea (and others)

Distribution:

Original - DCI w/SC 01864/84, CY 17, OGI 30 Mar 84 memo,

and EA 84-10045

1 - DDI w/o att

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DDI/RMGates/ (2 April 1984)

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Approved For Release 2008/05/08: CIA-RDP89B00423R000100040040-7

Executive Registry

84 - 1151

9 March 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

North Korea

Ambassador Dixie Walker was in for lunch yesterday, full of ideas. He pressed particularly on two things.

The first is to mine more carefully for economic, political and sociological information about North Korea which provides us with early warning information. There appears to be reams of material which are not worked over. I inquired about the South Koreans yesterday on this. They apparently don't do much and his view is they would see it through a different kind of prism and that it is something to which we should pay more attention. Both were there and took this on board so you can strike that from your list. I will expect that that issue will be addressed satisfactorily but you might want to follow up on it.

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Secondly, Walker has said that we are missing an opportunity to get a better understanding of what it is that has extended North Korean activity and influence so widely around the world. What things they offer? What is the nature of their protective security and security services, their economic and construction activity and their arms sales? What did we learn about their rationale and the contribution of the 17 or so North Koreans who we found in Grenada? What can we learn from other countries who had them there and kicked them out or otherwise terminated the relationship. What will all this tell us about where they will be next, what they are likely to do, what we can do to counter or head it off? Your Directorate just did something close to this on Libya. I would like to suggest that we develop the same kind of comprehensive catalogue of the nature and capabilities of the Libyan, North Korean, East German, Cuban, South Yemen, Bulgarian capabilities for destabilization, fostering and supporting insurgency, and securing the hold of Marxist governments that you have just completed on how Iran, Syria, Libya, the East Bloc, Cuba, et al, foster and use terrorist organizations around the world. This would be a companion piece on an equally serious threat, both of which are somewhat intertwined in nature and purpose.

William J. Casey

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